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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FRANK E. DOUGLAS, and
DRUE E. DOUGLAS,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
- vs.R. C. DUVALI_j,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case No.
8484

Appellants' Brief
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an Appeal from a verdict of a jury rendered
in the above entitled cause on the 3rd of November, 1955.
The action was originally commenced by Appellants
against Respondent to recover damages which the Plaintiffs claimed resulted from the false and fraudulent
representations of the Defendant. The Defendant, R. C.
Duvall, is the President of the Ogden First Federal
Savings & Loan Association and a director of the Commercial Security Bank. He has been engaged in the
1
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savings and loan business in Ogden for approximately
20 years. Prior to the time of his coming to Ogden, he
had .experience in oil and gas operations ( Tr. 94). Some
years prior to 1950 Mr. Duvall became interested in a
mining prospect in Southwestern Idaho known as the
Sundance Mine. For several years exploratory work
":as done by Mr. Duvall and two associates, !ir. Froerer
and J1r. Barrett. In the summer and fall of 1949 a Mr.
Roger Pierce, a mining engineer, was employed to make
a survey and report on the ore located on the property.
Mr. Pierce submitted his report on or about January,
1950 (Tr. 96) in which he stated that results of diamond
drilling ''indica ted large widths of mineralization that
for the most part assayed too low to be of commercial
value.'' He further reported that, based upon other
information, including information obtained from tunneling he would conclude that ''including the area developed
and reasonable extensions beyond developed phases,
there is indica ted 200,000 tons of provable and probable
ore reserves having a value of about $7.00 a ton." (Tr.
96) On a basis of 90 per cent recoYery, :Jir. Pierce stated
that Mr. Duvall should expert to be able to realize
approximately $6.30 per ton out of the ore and that
actual mining costs should amount to about $1.75 per
ton and milling costs 90e per ton. This eost, together
with a royalty of 10 per cent payable to the land owner
( 63c per ton), 'Yould make a mining cost of $3.28 per
ton (Tr. 97). No report 'Yas made or estimate given on
general overhead or operating and managerial costs.
2
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Thereafter, in March of 1950 Mr. Duvall and his
associates organized a corporation for the purpose of
engaging in mining the properties which then became
known as the Duvall Mine. At the time of incorporation,
1Ir. Duvall claimed to have put into the properties about
$16,000.00 in development and exploration ( Tr. 428).
The properties were turned into the Corporation at a
value of $700,000.00 and stock issued to Mr. Duvall and
his family of a par value of $480,000.00. No actual cash
was paid into the Corporation by any of the incorporators. (Exh. K)
About the time of the incorporation, Mr. Duvall
called Appellant Frank Douglas, a practicing dentist in
Ogden, to Duvall's office at the Ogden First Federal
Savings & Loan Association and, as a result of the
representations made to Douglas and his wife, induced
them to loan to the Duvall Company the sum of $20,000.00
(Tr. 23-32). In order to advance the money to the Duvall
Mining Company, Dr. and Mrs. Douglas borrowed
$20,000.00 and a note was signed by Mr. Duvall on behalf
of the Duvall Mining Company on a form used by the
Ogden First Federal in the amount of such loan. In
addition to giving the note, Mr. Duvall also transferred
to the Douglases 2400 shares of the capital stock of the
Duvall Mining Company (Tr. 66).
Subsequent thereto the Douglases from time to time
advanced to the Duvall Mining Company various sums
of money until the total of $57,686.20 was loaned. In the
fall of 1950 $686.20 was advanced on a purported assess3
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ment of stock for which a note was taken. In December
of 1950 a loan of $15,000.00 was made. At this time, in
order to obtain the funds to make the loan Dr. and Mrs.
Douglas had to mortgage their home, which they did to
the Ogden First Federal at the instance of Mr. Duvall.
During the interim, considerable improvements had been
made at the mine by the construction of facilities for
mining and milling the ore. The mine itself went into
production about September 1, 1950. During its operation in 1950 and part of 1951 the mine was under the
direction of ~fr. ~Iiles P. Romney, who prior to his association with the Duvall ~fining Company was employed
by the United States Smelting, Refining and Mining
Company. He also had assisted in the examination of
the properties by Mr. Pierce (Tr. 308), and directed the
construction of the Mill in the spring of 1950 (Tr. 315).
The mining operations closed down about the 30th of
November, 1950 (Tr. 316), at which time :Jir. Romney
gave to Mr. Duvall a written report showing the results
of operations from September to December, including
amount of ore produced, gold recoYery therefrom, cost
of production, and loss on operation (Exhibits Hand I).
The information contained in this report, however, was
available to Mr. Duvall before the report -was made,
since l\I r. Du\'all \Yas in close contact "~ith the mining
operation, kne\Y the amount of tonnage being produced,
and value of the gold content thereof, and the actual
amount of gold recovered ( Tr. 102, 103). He ";as also
aequainted with the costs of operations, issued the checks
in payment of the bills, and was a\Yare in the latter part
of November and first part of December that there had
4
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been a considerable loss in operations and that it would
be necessary to obtain from $15,000.00 to $25,000.00 to
pay the outstanding bills on the operation ( Tr. 492).
This \Vas the situation in Dec.ember 1950 when Dr.
and Mrs. Douglas were again asked by Mr. Duvall to
loan some money to the mining company, but no reference to the actual financial situation was made by l\Ir.
Duvall when he approached the Douglases on the matter
of a further loan.
Again, in l\Iay of 1951, shortly after operations commenced in that year, Dr. Douglas, at the request of Mr.
Duvall, loaned the company $5,000.00 which he obtained
by increasing the mortgage on the home, which in the
meantime had been reduced by substantial payments
thereon. In the late fall of 1951 Dr. Douglas was able
to discharge the mortgage at the bank and within a few
days thereafter he was again approached by Mr. Duvall
to loan the company additional money and to re-mortgage
his home for that purpose. This was done, and on December 26, 1951 a further loan of $15,000.00 was made. A
month or two prior to making this loan Dr. Douglas read
an article in the Ogden Standard Examiner concerning
the purported rich gold deposit being operated by the
Duvall Mining Company (Tr. 41). This article appears
as Exhibit G, and gives similar information to that
claimed by Appellants to have been given by Mr. Duvall
when the first loan was made. The information for the
article and accompanying pictures 'vere furnished by
Mr. Duvall ( Tr. 120, 121).
5
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The last loan was made in July of 1952, when Appellants withdrew $2,000.00 from their childrens' savings
accounts in the Ogden First Federal Savings & Loan
Association and loaned that to the Duvall Company,
thereby making a total of $57,686.20 loaned by them to
the Duvall Company over the period of time involved.
The Duvall ~fine continued to operate in the year
1951 from early spring until late fall and also in the year
1952. However, value of the ore mined continued to be
considerably less than $7.00 per ton; and the costs of
production, including general overhead costs and managerial salaries, exceeded the amount received from the
ore by $2.00 to $7.00 per ton. The production figures
(Exhibit ~1:) show that in 1950, 4,491 tons of ore were
produced, from which $8,767.67 was received or $1.95
per ton. During the same period of time costs of production were $42,620.81 for a cost of $9.41 per ton,
making a net loss of $7.54 per ton. Thus, the more ore
the company attempted to produce, the greater its total
loss became, although in the year 1953 it was able to
reduce the loss per ton to $2.40.
In the fall of 1953 "ithin a fe"~ days after having
met Dr. Douglas on the street and telling him that everything was doing fine, the company had made a substantial
profit for the year, that all debts had been paid, and that
everything ""as in readiness to return some of the money
to the investors; 1\Ir. Duvall called a meeting and
announced that they 'vere through (Tr. 56). By that
time the company had mined a total of 113,409 tons of
6
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ore at a loss of $379,756.31 (Exhibit L). According to
Mr. Duvall, there was no further ore of commercial value
left; that diamond drilling had disclosed the ore to be
of too low a value to be mined commercially ( Tr. 138).
(This was the same conclusion which had been given by
~Ir. Pierce and Romney in respect to the diamond drilling which had been done in the summer of 1949.)
Dr. Douglas, claiming that he relied upon the representations made by Mr. Duvall in the spring of 1950,
and upon the statements made and the information given
subsequently, and having no information concerning the
actual financial condition of the company and its losses
during the time that the loans were made, commenced
this action against Mr. Duvall alleging in his Complaint
that the amounts loaned by plaintiff and his wife were
as a result of false and fraudulent representations made
to them by Mr. Duvall. The action was tried in Ogden,
Utah, before a jury. At the conclusion of the trial the
Court submitted to the jury 54 written interrogatories
to be answered, and which required every interrogatory
to be answered in the affirmative in order for the Plaintiff to recover. After several hours of deliberation, the
jury answered all of the interrogatories except the last
one in the negative. These interrogatories were the
same as to each of the six different loans or advances
made and were as follows:
'' 1. Were the representations or any of them
made "\vhen and as alleged o?
'' 2. Were such representations, if any you
find, concerning a presently existing, material
fact~

7
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'' 3. Were such representations (if any you
find) false'
'' 4. Did the defendant then and there· know
that said representations (if any you find) were
false or make such statements recklessly knowing
that he had insufficient knowledge upon which to
base such positive assertions, if any were made 1
'' 5. Were such false representations (if any
you find) made by the defendant for the purpose
of inducing the plaintiffs to act on the same~
'' 6. Did the plaintiffs act reasonably and in
ignorance of the falsity of said representations
(if any you find) ~
'' 7. Did the plaintiffs in fact rely on said
representations (if any you find)?
'' 8. Were the plaintiffs then, there and thereby induced to act by parting with their money~
'' 9. How much by "\Yay of money damages, if
any you find, did plaintiffs sustain by reason of
the arts and conduct of the defendant.'' (R. 82-87)
In preparing for the argument of the case to the
jury counsel for Appellant obtained a transcript of a
portion of the testimony of the Defendant Duvall, intending to read to the jury the testimony of ~ir. Duvall
with respect to the alleged representations made by him
to the Douglases. ''Then counsel for Appellants announced to the jury that he expected to read the actual
testimony, Defense c~ounsel objected, w·hereupon the
Court sustained the objection and refused to allo"r
counsel for Appellants to read such portion of the
transcript.

8
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
In connection with this Appeal, Appellants cite as
error the action of the trial court in submitting the case
to the jury on special interrogatories, claiming that
various instructions and comments of the Court were
improper, as well as refusing to allow counsel to read
a portion of the transcript of the testimony. The points
relied upon by Appellants for reversal of the judgment
and the matters which are claimed to be error on the
part of the trial court are as follows:
1. The court erred in submitting the matter to the
jury on written interrogatories.
2. The court erred in instructing the jury that it
was necesary for them to find the claimed representations
to have been made as and when alleged in the Complaint,
without advising the jury that such representations could
be proved in substance and effect.
3. The court erred in refusing to instruct the jury
that when a representation was made, if any should be
found by the jury, it could thereafter be relied upon as
a continuing statement of fact with the same force and
effect until it was known or should have been known to
the Plaintiffs that such representation was in fact false.
4. The court erred in instructing the jury in effect
that Dr. Douglas was a director and as such had knowledge of the affairs of the Duvall Company. (Tr. 575)
9
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5. The court erred in commenting on the weight of
the evidence in stating to the jury, ''I charge you that
a man can't plug up his ears and not observe what a
reasonable person should observe and not learn what the
reasonable person should learn and not hear what was
said, if anything was said, concerning the operation of
this company." (Tr. 575)
6. The court erred in commenting to the jury, "Now,
if you find that something like that happened, of the
nature that a reasonable man ought to act on, then you
can't award judgment on some representation, because
a man can't blow hot and cold. He either relies or he
doesn't rely, and he sees the sun come up in the morning
or he doesn't see the sun come up in the morning. If he
hears certain things he hears certain things, and if he
sees a report he sees a report, and he is charged with
'vhat 's in there." (Tr. 576)
7. The court erred in refusing to allow counsel to
read a portion of the transcript of the testimony in the
closing argument.
8. In any event the court erred in failing to direct
a verdict in whole or in part for the Plaintiffs in connection with their Complaint.
The foregoing statement of points 'vill be consolidated for the purpose of argument into the following
propositions :

10
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I

The court erred in submitting the matter to the jury
upon special interrogatories.
II
The court erred in its instructions to the jury.
III
The court erred in commenting upon the evidence
during the course of its Instructions.

IV
The court erred in refusing to allow counsel to read
from a transcript of the testimony in closing argument.

v
The court erred in refusing to direct a verdict in
favor of the Plaintiffs upon all of part of Plaintiffs'
complaint.

ARGUMENT
I

THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE
MATTER TO THE JURY UPON SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES.
It is significant in this case that because the matter
was one involving an action for fraud, that at the outset
Plaintiffs had the responsibility of proving such fraud
by clear and convincing evidence. Too, there were six
11
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different transactions in which the Plaintiffs had loaned
or advanced money to the Duvall Company at the instance and request of the Defendant Duvall so that
insofar as attempting to present the matter to the jury
upon special intorrogatories the court was under the
responsibility clearly and specifically to define the issues
to the jury and to take from them all matters which in
any event "\vould not be material for them to consider.
For instance, if the case \Yere to be submitted properly to the jury upon interrogatories the court should
have instructed the jury as a matter of law, that if they
found that the Defendant represented to the Plaintiff
that not less than 300,000 tons of ore had been blocked
out, such representation was a false representation. The
report of ~Ir. Pierce, which had been written up as a
result of his survey of the property and tunneling, clearly
states that not to exceed 200,000 tons of ore was blocked
out, including both the proven and probable reserves
(Tr. 96). Nor does the evidence disclose that such report
was made as a result of diamond drilling, although Plaintiffs claimed that the Defendant represented to them that
the ore which was proven and blocked out \vas ascertained
as a result of diamond drilling. Obviously, use of the
phrase ''diamond drilling'' "Tould be more persuasive
in indicating that there ''Tas no question \Yith respect to
the nature and extent of surh ore than to say the only
basis for concluding there \Vas a quantity of ore blocked
out \Yas as a result of tunneling or snrYey. The very fact
that in the operation of the mine no ore of commercial
value was produeed and only a totnl of 113,409 tons of
12
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ore were mined is indicative of the fact that without
diamond drilling it was impossible to determine the
extent of the ore body. Of further significance is the
fact that the original diamond drilling done, and which
was referred to by Mr. Pierce in his report, disclosed that
there was no ore of commercial quantity or value on the
property. Notwithstanding the foregoing undisputed
evidence the court submitted to the jury not only whether
the statement claimed by the Plaintiff to have been made
by the Defendant that no less than 300,000 tons of ore
had been blocked out as a result of diamond drilling was
in fact made, but also whether such statement was false.
The manner in which the interrogatories were
phrased would indicate that the jury was to answer
whether any particular representation concerned a presently existing material fact or was false only if the jury
should first find that a representation was made. All of
the questions following Interrogatory Number 1 are
conditioned upon the jury finding that a representation
was made. Therefore, in answering the interrogatories
subsequent to Number 1 the jury must have determined
that certain representations were made by the Defendant
to the Plaintiffs as alleged in Plaintiffs' Complaint.
Although written interrogatories are specifically
authorized under the provisions of Rule 49, U.R.C.P.,
\vi thin the trial court's discretion, nevertheless it has
been held that answers to such interrogatories cannot
be inconsistent. In 53 Am. Jur. TRIAL, Section 1082,
p. 750 appears the following statement:
13
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''Inconsistent and conflicting findings in
special verdicts and answers to interrogatories
neutralize each other and must be disregarded.
rrherefore, if findings are made which are contradictory as to material facts, such facts are left
undetermined and since it is not the province of
the court, unless by consent, to determine them
no judgment can be rendered.''
'
In the case of Great Western Land and Improvement
Co. v. Sandygren, 141 Wn. 451, 252 Pac. 123, the Plaintiff company sought to recover on two promissory notes
executed by Defendant to a C. W. Brockman and by him
transferred to a bank which in turn negotiated the notes
to the Plaintiff. The Defendant contended that the notes
were given as a rE!sult of false and fraudulent representations and that the Plaintiff acquired the notes with
knowledge of the fraud. At the -conclusion of the trial
the jury returned a general verdict in favor of Defendant, at the same time answering certain interrogatories.
Questions 3, 4 and 5, " . ith the answers, were as follows:
''Special Verdict No. 3. If you answer special
Verdict No. 1 in the affirmati\e state if the First
Exchange N atioual Bank of Coeur d '. .1\_lene, Idaho,
purchased said notes in good faith ......\.nswer: No.
''Special Verdict No. 4. If you ans,ver special
, . erdirt No. 1 in the affirmatiYe, state if the First
Exchange N a tiona! Bank of Coeur d'Alene, Idaho,
had at the time of purchase any notice of any
alleged false and fraudulent representations made
hv
. Brockman to the defendant bv. "'"hich she was
indueed to sign the notes. .A. us,Yer: No.
'' Sperinl Verdict No. 5. If you answer Special
Verdict No. 4 in the negative, then answer if the

14
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plaintiff was a party to any fraud or illegality
affecting these notes~ Answer : Yes.''
In considering the effect of these answers, the
court held:
''Special Verdict No. 3, that the Idaho bank
did not purchase the notes in good faith, is not
inconsistent with the general verdict in favor of
Mrs. Sandygren. That special verdict, standing
alone, supports the general verdict.
"Special Verdict No. 4, that the Idaho bank,
at the time of purchasing the notes, had no notice
of any alleged false and fraudulent representations made by Brockman to Mrs. Sandygren by
which she was induced to sign the notes, is inconsistent vvith the general verdict in favor of Mrs.
Sandygren. That special verdict, standing alone,
would call for the judgment which was rendered
in favor of the improvement company notwithstanding the general verdict in favor of Mrs.
Sandygren.
''Special Verdict No. 5 has no other effect than
to place the improvement company in the shoes
of the Idaho bank ; that is, to render the improvement company chargeable with notice of infirmities in the notes as the Idaho bank was so charged.
"It seems to us that these considerations call
for the conclusion that the improvement company
is not entitled to judgments upon the notes notwithstanding the general verdict in favor of Mrs.
Sandygren, because special verdict No. 4, upon
which such judgment must rest, is plainly negatived by special verdict No. 3. In other words,
reading these two special verdicts together, they
do not clearly show the improvement company
entitled to judgments notwithstanding the general
'15
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verdict. They are so contradictory as to destroy
each other in so far as either lends support to
judgments in favor of the improvement company.
We are therefore of the opinion that the trial
court was in error in rendering judgments in
favor of the improvement company upon the
theory that the special verdicts call for such judgments notwithstanding the general verdict.
''It seems to us that :Jirs. Sandygren must also
fail in her claim for judgments in her favor upon
the general verdict, since special verdict No. 4
negatives her right in that behalf, though special
verdict No. 3 supports her claim in that behalf.
There is a sense in which these two special verdicts may be considered as destroying each other.
They do have that effect in so far as either can
be the basis, standing alone, of any judgment for
or against either of the parties to this action. But
we think special verdict No. 4 also destroys the

effect of the general verdict in favor of Mrs.
Sandygren. For, manifestly, if the notes were
purchased by the Idaho bank without notice of
the alleged false and fraudulent representations
made by Brockman to :Jirs. Sandygren inducing
her to execute them, the general verdict in her
favor could not lJaYe been correctly rendered by
the jury. Noting this inco1zsistcncy between spec£al verd z:ct l\' o. 4 and the general verdict, and the
inconsistency betu,een special rerdict No. 3 and
s JJecial rerdict No. 4, it is pla·in, 1re think, that
the Jury d1~d not at all co'niJ>t"ehen-d the issues in
the case, and that therefore Jlrs. Sa1zdygren, as
'lrrll as the in1proren1cnt co1npany, is 11of entitled
to jnd/ln1rnt iu her favot" upon the general -'Cerdict.
'~rhe

problem is an in,TolYed one by reason of this
double inconsistenr~T· We do not deem it necessary
t.o ht~re 11otire the numerous decisions of the courts
touching the general subject. In 38 Cyc. 1926, a.nd
16
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27 R.C.L. 879, are found observations which we
regard as lending support to our conclusion th~t
no judgment can be rightfully rendered upon this
record in favor of either the improvement company or 1\Irs. Sandygren.
''What then shall we do with the case~ The
answer to this question, we think, is found in the
fact that the case remains undisposed of, and
without a record enabling the superior court or
this court to lawfully pronounce a final judgment
for or against either of the parties. This manifestly means that the case should be regarded as
still pending and undisposed of, and that therefore a new trial should be directed; this regardless of want of timely motion by either party in
that behalf." (Italics added)
Again in the case of Porter vs. Western N. C. Railway Company, 97 N.C. 66, 2 S.E. 580, the court held that
the jury's answers to special interrogatories were inconsistent, requiring a new trial. There the jury answered
''no'' in response to the question, ''Did Plaintiff intestate contribute to his own injury by his negligence.''
The jury also answered ''yes'' to the question, ''Did
Plaintiff's intestate know that the locomotive engineer
whose carelessness caused the accident was incompetent,
inefficient and careless in the operation of the engine."
In Raymond v. Keseberg, 84 Wis. 302, 54 N.W. 612,
the court held that a special finding by the jury that an
abutting owner did not use ordinary care and prudence
to prevent injury to travelers on the highway would not
justify a verdict against such owner without any finding
that injury to a traveler resulted from such failure where
another special finding held that the injury complained
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of was caused by the negligence of the city alone. This,
even though it was apparent that the city's negligence
must have been that of the abutting owner also.
The impropriety of the court in the instant case is
further emphasized by the failure and refusal to take
from the jury any of the elements which must be established in order to prove fraud. Although our Supreme
Court has in the past outlined nine elements of fraud,
the evidence of this case would not justify the submission of each of those elements to the jury. There was
certainly no issue on whether the Plaintiff relied upon
the alleged representations in making the loans to the
Duvall Company. He testified that he did and there is
no evidence to contradict such (Tr. 32). Likewise, there
could be no contention but that the claimed representation that 300,000 tons of ore had been blocked out as a
result of diamond drilling was a representation of a
presently existing material fact.
Another reason for pointing out the above inconsistency on the part of the trial court is to emphasize
that the case here in question was not one which should
have been submitted to the jury upon special interrogatories unless the same "~ere simplified and reduced to a
limited n urn ber actually applying to the issue of fact in
the case. Obviously, counsel for Respondent will urge
that because the ans"Ters to the first interrogatory (as
to "·hether or not such representation \Yas made) were
all in the negative would thereby make it unnecessary
to determine \\rhether it \vas error on the part of the
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court to submit the additional interrogatories. In
answer to such a proposition, we respectfully submit
that the answers to the subsequent interrogatories indicate that the jury must have concluded that representations were in fact made in order to answer such questions. While the court in effect instructed the jury that
unless they found a representation to have been made
to the Plaintiff as alleged in the Complaint, it would not
be necessary for them to consider any further questions,
the jury, nevertheless, did proceed to answer subsequent
questions as though such representations were made.
Another reason for assigning as error the action of
the trial court in submitting the matter to the jury on
special interrogatories lies in the lack of complete and
adequate instructions on the subject matter in issuethe alleged fraud of the Defendant. In 24 Am. Jur.
FRAUD AND DECEIT, Sec. 299, p. 147, is set forth the
general rule governing instructions in cases of this kind,
as follows:
''The general rules governing the form and
sufficiency of instructions and the necessity for
and propriety of giving them are, of course,
applicable in actions based on fraud. The court
is not permitted to invade the province of the jury
in deciding disputed matters of fact in reference
to the fraud charged under the guise of instructing them. The purpose of instructing the jury is
to enlighten them by giving them a stalement of
the propositions of law applicable to the issues
to be decided. Hence, the primary requisite of
instructions is that they be correct in substance.
Accordingly, the instructions relative to frarud
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should be correct front the standpoint of the lOJW
of fraurl arnd deceit, and an objection may be prop~rly ':rged against any instruction which is faulty
In this respect, even to the extent of securing a
reversal on appeal if the error appears in the
record and is prejudicial and the party complaining of the error has not estopped himself by
having taken upon the trial the same position as
that expressed by the court in the instruction.''
(Italics added)
In the instant matter, Plaintiff requested several
instructions \vhich the court refused under the guise that
such instructions ·w·ere ''not appropriate to a special
verdict'' (R. 34). Such an instruction requested by the
Plaintiff, and which was not only proper but should have
been given regardless of whether special interrogatories
were submitted to the jury, reads as follows:
' 'You are instructed that in determining
whether or not the plaintiffs, in this case, were
induced to advance money to the Duvall Corporation by reason of the representations of the defendant, you may take into consideration the
position of the defendant in respect to the plaintiffs, his position and standing in the community,
the nature of the business and actiYities in which
he "'as engaged, the position he occupied with
respect to the DnYall ('~orporation, and all facts
and circumstances \Yhich you may determine ha\e
a bearing on the relationship of the parties to this
action.''
Like,Yise, l:>laintiffs ~ Requested Instruction No. 4
\vas refused, although it should have been given to the
jury as a part of the gt•neral instructions:
20
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''You are instructed that a bad motive is not
an essential element of fraud, and, therefore, in
this case, plaintiffs are not required to prove that
the defendant had a bad motive in order to recover
from the defendant on plaintiffs' complaint.''
Failure of the court to give these requested instructions, and each of them, was excepted to by Plaintiff ( Tr.
595). Attention of the court "\vas called to the fact that
not .only had the instructions as requested been refused
but that no instruction covering the same subject matter
had been given.
Thus the entire manner in "\vhich the rase was submitted to the jury "\vas sufficiently confusing that it is
impossible to say what the jury would or would not have
done in respect to the rna tter if the case had been submitted to them properly, either upon a general verdict
or upon limited number of special interrogatories designed to elicit answers with respect to the issues of
fact only and the jury had answered them consistently.
We respectfully submit in this case the use of the special
interrogatories only confused the jury in respect to the
issues before them and resulted in the Plaintiffs not
having a fair and impartial trial and leaves the issue
of whether the defendant made false and fraudulent
representations to the plaintiffs undecided.

II
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS
TO THE JURY.
Appellants claim that the court committed several
errors in respect to the instructions given to the jury.
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In the first place, the court required the jury to find if
any of the representations were made ''when and as
alleged," (R. 82). As indicated above, one of the chief
representations claimed to have been made to him by
the Defendant was that 300,000 tons of ore had been
blocked out as a result of diamond drilling.. The jury
might well have considered that the representation that
300,000 tons of ore was blocked out was made, but
answered the interrogatory in the negative because the
other portion of the statement that it ·was a result of
diamond drilling had not been made. Or, the jury may
have considered that the representation was made that
the amount of ore which the Plaintiff claimed the Defendant represented had been blocked out was approximately 300,000 tons whereas the Complaint referred to
the representation that it was not less than 300,000 tons.
In either event, the jury should have answered that a
representation was made, although made in substanc-e
and effect.
We submit that the court should have instructed the
jury to answer the Interrogatory numbered 1 in the
affirmative if they found that either or all of the representations claimed to have been made w·ere made in substance and effect at or about the time alleged. Failure
of the trial court so to do after the matter was called
to its nttention constitutes reversible error.
Immediately after the parties had rested, and prior
to the submission of requested instructions, counsel for
Plaintiff in a discussion with the court and opposing
22
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counsel stated that Plaintiff wanted the court specifically
to instruct the jury that when a statement was made by
Defendant as to any matter, such statement would be
continuing and remain until such time as Defendant
retracted the statement or Plaintiff became aware of the
true facts (Tr. 563). Subsequently, Plaintiff requested
such an instruction of the court (R. 43). Although the
Requested Instruction (Plaintiff's Requested Instruction
No. 12) is marked "given in substance" by the court,
such instruction was not given in substance, nor did
the court instruct the jury on Plaintiff's theory of the
case in this respect.
During the course of the trial counsel for Defendant
maintained that with respect to statements made by Mr.
Duvall in the spring of 1950 as to the value or gold
content of the ore, cost of mining and milling, and percent of recovery were first of all based upon the Engineer's report and at any event were statements concerning a future, rather than a presently existing fact.
However, the mine went into production in September
1950, and immediately thereafter it became apparent to
Mr. Duvall that the ore was considerably lower in gold
content than $7.00 per ton, to-wit: approximately $4.50
per ton; that only one-third of the gold was being recovered from the ore; and that it was costing in excess
of $6.28 per ton to extract the gold (not including
depreciation, depletion and royalty). ( Exhs. H and I,
Tr. 101)
Even assuming, for the purpose of argument, that
when Mr. Duvall approached Dr. Douglas to loan the
23
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Duvall Mining Company $20,000.00, in the spring of
1950, that from the best source of information available
it appeared that there were 200,000 tons of ore, averaging $7.00 per ton available; that it would cost only $3.28
per ton to mine and mill the ore, and that it would be
possible to extract 90% of the gold from the ore, nevertheless by the time Mr. Duvall approached Dr. Douglas
in December 1950 and asked the latter to mortgage his
home and loan the Company another $15,000.00, it was
then apparent to l\Ir. Duvall that all the previous information furnished to Dr. Douglas was false and Defendant
then and there had the duty to disclose to the Plaintiff
the true facts with respect to assay Yalues, per cent of
recovery and production costs. His failure to do so
constituted a re-affirmation of the previous statements
and representations and a fraud upon Plaintiffs.
The principle of law involved is well stated in the
Restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol. 3, Sec. 551, as
follows:
'' ( 2) One party to a business transaction is
under a duty to exercise reasonable care to disclose to the other before the transaction is consummated
(a) such matters as the other is entitled to
kno"\v because of a fiduciary or other
similar relation of trust and confidence
hPt"·c·t)n them,
(b) au.11 s u bseq u cntly acquired -information
1ch ich h c rcco gn iz·c s as Jnaking untrue or
Jn£slcad iug a JH~e v-ious representation
24

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

which when made was true or believed to
be so,
(c) the falsity of a misrepresentation which
\Yhen made was not made for the purpose
of its being acted upon if he subsequently
ascertains that the other is a bout to act
in reliance upon it in a transaction with
him.'' (Italics added)

In discussing the applicability of Sub-paragraph
2(b ), the following illustration, appropro of the present
situation, is given:
'' 2. A, the president of a mercantile corporation, makes a true statement of its financial position to a credit rating company intending the
substance of it to be published by it to its subscribers as is done. The corporation's financial
position becomes seriously impaired but A does
not inform the credit rating company of this fact.
The corporation receives goods on credit from B,
a subscriber of the rating company, who when the
goods are bought is relying, as A knows, on the
credit rating based on his statements to the rating
company. A is liable in deceit to B.''

There is a presumption in law which arises that once
a fact or condition is shown to exist it continues to remain
in existence until the contrary is shown, or until a different presumption is raised from the nature of the
subject in question. (See 20 Am. Jur., EVIDENCE, Sec.
207, p. 205.) But whether you apply the principle that
the matters reported to Dr. and Mrs. Douglas in March,
1950 would be presumed to continue until they had been
advised to the contrary, or whether you apply the principles enunciated in the Restatement of the Law of Torts,
25
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the result is the same-the court should have instructed
the jury in respect to the matter, as requested by Plaintiffs or otherwise, as long as the theory was properly
outlined.

On the cross-examination of Dr. Douglas, he was
asked by counsel for the Defendant whether or not he
continued to serve as a director of the Company during
the period of time that the mine was in operation. Dr.
Douglas answered that he did not know whether he was
or was not a director, although he attended directors'
meetings in good faith "thinking I was a director, but
after the mine shut down I went to Lawrence Malan's
office ... '' At that time he was interrupted by counsel,
who said that "I am not questioning whether you were
a director or not, you thought you were a director and
purported to act as a director''' (Tr. 84) The only other
testimony in the record to the effect that the Plaintiff
Douglas ever appeared to be a director in the Duvall
Mining Company appears in the testimony of Mr. Duvall
who testified that Dr. Douglas had been appointed to the
Board of Directors in December of 1950 and thereafter
elected to serve on the Board at subsequent stockholders
meetings. (Tr. 435, 436)
Upon further cross-examination, Plaintiff answered:
'' Q. Did you as a director eYer seek to inform
~~ourself lll\yond the information you received
ft·om 1\lr. Duvnll as to the rompany,s operations
and ho\\~ it "~as doing-1
" ·\
.A

•

~ro •
...l'
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'' Q. Never made any inquiry as a director?

"A. No.
"Q. I take it that at these directors' meetings
which you attended the operations of the company
were discussed and considered by the directors?
''A. They were discussed some.

'' Q. Yes. And I take it that the need of the
company to make additional borrowing was discussed at those directors' meetings¥
''A. At one or two of them that was discussed,
that I attended. You realize that the last three,
one was on the night he told me everything was
over, and the other one was after it closed down.

'' Q. What date did you attend directors' meetings¥
''A. I attended them on February 15, October-

"Q. What year,

please~

"A. 1951; October 10, 1951." (Tr. 84, 85)
Notwithstanding the dispute as to whether Dr.
Douglas was or was not a member of the Board of
Directors, the court in its instructions to the jury stated,
in commenting that a person should observe and learn
what a reasonable person should learn and hear:
" ... and that's especially true, Mrs. Nylander and
gentlemen, if the person happens to hold the high
office of a director in a corporation. As a matter
of law, a director had access-that is, in ordinary
corporations-to the books and records. He's .one
of the managers and he's supposed to be on the
job and acquaint himself with what's going on.
So in connection with this reliance and with this
27
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continuing representation, if any you find, you
must give consideration as to the question of
whether this man, whether Mr. Douglas heard
anything or did anything or saw anything that
would put him on notice, at least as to subsequent
transactions." (Tr. 575, 576)
It is Appellants' contention that not only does this
instruction in effect advise the jury that Dr. Douglas
was a member of the Board of Directors, it further
directs them that as a member of such Board he was
conclusively presumed to be in possession of all of the
information that would be available to him if he had
insisted upon looking at the records and books. It was
obvious during the course of the trial that the Plaintiff,
Douglas, did not have access to the records and books
of the company ; that by reason of the representations
made to him by the Defendant and the latter's position
in the community, Plaintiff was induced to rely thereon
and lulled into a position of not looking elsewhere for
facts which might have legally been available to him as
a stockholder in the Du·vall Company. (Tr. 87, 88) In
any event he did not attend any directors' meetings until
February, 1951, at \Yhirh time three of the so-called loans
had been made. Thereafter and during the time that
the loans were made by him he attended only one other
meeting of the Board of Directors (October, 1951) so
that he could not ha Ye been in actual possession of facts
whieh \vould have put him on notice of the financial
condition of the compau~~ and the mining operations
unless ht' had been advised of such matters in the course
of these meetings. Dr. Douglas testified that he 'yas
28
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not so advised. (Tr. 86) Mr. Duvall testified that the
matters were always brought up at the meetings as to
the operations of the company and as to how things
·were getting along.
We submit that the court should have instructed
the jury that they were to find whether or not Dr. Douglas ·was in fact a member of the Board of Directors; and
that only if they should find that he was a member,
would he be required to have knowledge of the facts
with respect to the condition of the company. Even
then, if the jury should further find that he was induced
to rely upon the representations made to him by Mr.
Duvall so that he made no inquiry and did not examine
the books and records of the company, he would not be
charged with knowledge of the true facts.
This matter was discussed between court and counsel
prior to instructing the jury where the following comments were made :
''MR. NIELSEN : I think the court has to
instruct the jury that the fact that he's a director,
if it is a fact"THE COURT: Does not in and of itself
alone'' ~IR. NIELSEN: -give him knowledge of
what took place.
''MR. OLMSTEAD: It doesn't estop him
from bringing the action.
'' 1IR. NIELSEN: It didn't impute any facts
or knowledge to him.
29
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"THE COURT: Well, it puts him in a position so he can obtain information reasonably.
''MR. WALLER: But it doesn't impute any
to him, Judge.
''THE COURT: It puts him in a position to
get something.
''MR. NIELSEN : Not any more than a stockholder, Judge.
''THE COURT: A director is a pretty powerful guy.
"MR. CAMPBELL: He doesn't have a duty
as a stockholder .to find it out.'' ( Tr. 565)
The court failed properly to instruct the jury on
this matter so that Plaintiffs respectfully urge that such
action was error, requiring a reversal of the judgment
and the granting of a new trial.
III
THE COURT ERRED IN CO~fl\1ENTING UPON
THE EVIDENCE DURING THE COURSE OF ITS
INSTRUCTIONS.
Perhaps one of the reasons 'vhy the Court's instructions in this case are brought into question is due to the
fact that the Trial Court instructed the jury orally
immediately at the close of the evidence and then had
such instructions reduced to 'vriting and given to the
jury the following morning 'vhen it ''Tent to the jury
room after the closing arguments of counsel. There is
no doubt that the trial court "~as some,vhat hurried and
this may necount for the failure adequately to cover the
30
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issues involved and correctly and specifically to give the
instructions on the law as it applied to the case. The
giving of oral instructions tends to open the door to
comments by the court with respect to the evidence.
Certainly such was the present situation, and the trial
court in at least two instances made comments that,
Appellants respectfully urge, so invaded the province
of the jury in respect to the weight to be given to the
evidence as to require a new trial. The law in this State
for many years has been, and now is, that in giving its
instructions to the jury the court ''shall not comment
on the evidence in the case.'' (See former Section 10424-14, U.C.A., 1943) The foregoing rule is now stated
as a part of Rule 51, U.R.C.P.
The comments of the trial court, which are claimed
to be error by Appellants, are in substance: First, the
trial court, while referring to the fact that the jury may
or may not determine that the representations, if any
made, were of a continuing nature, went on to say:
"In this connection, however, I charge you
that a man can't plug up his ears and not observe
wha-t a reasonable person should observe and not
learn what a reasonable person should learn, and
not hear what was said, if anything was said, concerning the operation of this Company. And
that's especially true, Mrs. Nylander and gentle·men, if the person happens to hold the high office
of a director in a corporation. As a matter of law,
a director has access-that is, in ordinary corporations-to the books and records. He's one
of the managers and he's supposed to be on the
job and acquaint himself with what's going on.''
(Italics added)
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Again, immediately following the above comment
the court went on to say:
"Now, if you find that something like that
happened, of the nature that a reasonable man
ought to act on, then you can't award judgment
on some representation, because a man can't blow
hot and cold. He either relies or he doesn't rely,
and he sees the sun come up in the morning or he
doesn't see the sun come up in the morning. If
he hears certain things he hears certain things,
and if he sees a report he sees a report, and he's
charged with "That's in there.'' (Italics added)
The effect of these statements was to impress the
jury with the fact that they were to resol\e the questions
in favor of the Defendant and against the Plaintiffs upon
the ground and for the reason that the Court believed
that the Plaintiffs had knowledge of the affairs of the
corporation or had closed their eyes to information
which was available to them. The court did not leave it
up to the jury to decide whether they did have such
knowledge, but in effect instructed them that Plaintiffs
had seen or observed the books and records of the compan~~ and had heard and learned of the financial condition of the company during the time the loans "\vere being
made.
Actually, Plaintiffs could not have known of the
financial position of the company during the spring,
summer, and fall of 1950. There is no claim made that
they sa \Y auy financial report, that the records and books
of the company "\V('re up to date, or that any 'Yritten
report of assays of the ore "\\Tl~re made during that period
32
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of time. No claim is even made by the Defendant that
Dr. Douglas was a director during this period of time
nor that he saw or had access to the records and books
of the Company. Thus for such period of time the court,
as a matter of law, should have instructed the jury that
he did not see, hear or learn that the representations
made to him by the Defendant, Duvall, were false representations of fact.
The law with respect to commenting on the evidence
is ·well stated. In 3 Am. Jur. APPEAL AND ERROR,
Section 1055, p. 606, as follows :
''Generally speaking, the sufficiency of the
evidence must be left to the jury. It is reversible
error for the court to overstep the limits of the
rule in the particular jurisdiction in its comments
on the evidence, especially comments on the weight
and sufficiency of the evidence, at least if injury
results therefrom. There is frequently a question
in the individual case as to whether what was said
amounted to a comment on the evidence within
the prohibition of the rule.''
This court, in the case of State vs. Green, 77 Utah
580, 6 Pac. 2(d) 177, made the following statement with
respect to commenting on the evidence :
"There can be no serious doubt but that it was
error to give instruction No. 3 and that part of
instruction No. 4 which we have quoted. In this
jurisdiction the trial judge is not permitted to
comment on the evidence, much less may he indicate to the jttry that some material facts, not admitted at the trial, are established beyond controversy. It is the sole and exclusive province of the
jury to determine the facts in all criminal cases,
33
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whether the evidence offered by the state is weak
or strong, is in conflict or is not controverted.
Evidence may be ever so convincing that an
accused is guilty of the crime charged, yet, it is
for the jury and not for the trial judge to render
the verdict. If the trial judge may not find a
verdict of guilty, so, likewise he may not find any
of the facts which are necessary elements of the
crime for which the accused is being tried.''
(Italics added)
In a North Carolina case of In Re Bartlett's Will,
70 S.E. 2(d) 482, the court observed:
''The founders of our legal system intended
that the right of trial by jury, whether constitutional or statutory in origin, should be a. vital
force rather than an empty form in the administration of justice. They realize that this could not
be if the petit jury should become a mere unthinking echo of the judge's will. To forestall such
eventuality·, they clearly demarkated the respective functions of the judge and the jury in both
civil and criminal trials in a familiar statute,
which was enacted in 1796, and which originally
bore this caption : ' . .~n Act to Secure the Impartiality of Trial by Jury, and to Direct the Conduct
of Judges in Charges to the Petit Jury'."
The statute referred to stated that "no judge shall
give an opinion to the jury in his charge to the jury,
'\\rhether or not a fact is fully or sufficiently proven, that
being the true office and province of the jury.''
The court

,,~(;_•nt

on to say:

"rrhis 8tntute iR designed to make effectual
the right of ever~~ litigant 'to ha,~e his eause con34
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sidered with the cold neutrality of the impartial
judge', and the equally unbiased mind of a properly instructed jury. Withers vs. Lane, 144 N. C.
184, 56 S. E. 855. ''
We respectfully submit that the foregoing comments
to the jury were such as to prejudice the Plaintiffs in
obtaining a fair trial. The trial judge himself appeared
to recognize the impropriety of his comments for he
stated to the jury immediately following that:
"Well, I may want to correct this a little bit
tomorrow morning. We'll see." (Tr. 576)
However, nothing was done to correct the impression given to the jury.

IV
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW
COUNSEL TO READ FROM A TRANSCRIPT OF
TESTIMONY IN FINAL ARGUMENT.
While there were a number of witnesses called both
on behalf of the Plaintiffs and Defendant in this case
the principal witnesses, who gave the most crucial testimony in the case, were the Plaintiff, Dr. Douglas and
the Defendant, Mr. Duvall. For this reason, it is obvious
that in order to present the matter fully and accurately
to the jury after a week of trial, a transcript of Mr.
Duvall's testimony on examination of him as a part of
Plaintiffs' evidence-in-chief, would be desirable and
effective in arguing the case to the jury. For this reason,
a transcript of such testimony was ordered early in the
course of the trial and such fact was well known to
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counsel for Defendant, who could have, if they so desired,
ordered a similar transcript or a transcript of the testimony of Dr. Douglas. Because counsel for the Plaintiff
intended to read the transcript of such testimony to the
jury in the course of his argument, the specific matters
with respect to the admissions made by Mr. Duvall as
to his statements during the original conversation between him and Dr. Douglas in March of 1950, as well as
his knowledge with respect to the representations made
on that occasion and subsequently, was not digested and
summarized for the purpose of presenting it to the jury
in narrative form.
When counsel for Plaintiff made his opening remarks
to the jury, he advised them that because the trial had
been long and involved and because it would be difficult
to remember the testimony which had been presented on
behalf of Plaintiffs' Complaint at the beginning of the
trial, he desired to read to them some of the testimony
of the Defendant, Duvall, and particularly that portion
of his testimony ''Thich had been elicited on examination
by counsel as a part of the Plaintiffs' case. Immediately
counsel for the Defendant arose to his feet and stated:
'' l\lR. YOUNG: I hesitate to interrupt counsel
in his argument, but at this time the defendant
desires to take Pxeeption to the statement of
counsel, and particularly to an:~ attempt, as indieat<-)d hr his statement, that he has had transcribed
and "\Yill read to this jury excerpts of testimony
'"hieh hn,Tt) been giYen. In our opinion that would
be highl~T prejudieial. The jury are here to try all
the facts, and You cannot read eYen from a deposition. lt 's a question of the Jury remembering
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the evidence and it would unduly emphasize certain parts of the evidence, and we object at this
time and ask the court to instruct counsel that
such conduct would be prejudicial.
''MR. NIELSEN : Well, if your Honor please,
I'm sure I'm entitled to read just as the jury, if
they want to hear any of the testimony, are
entitled to have any of it read to them. There's
nothing any court has ever said that counsel can't
either recall it specifically from memory or by
the written word." (Tr. 582, 583)
It is interesting to note that Mr. Young (Defendant's
attorney) apparently was under the impression that as
a matter of law it was impossible to read from any
transcript of testimony in argument to the jury. This
also appeared to be the Court's view of the matter, for
when counsel for the Plaintiff stated that there was
nothing in the law that would require the court to prohibit counsel from reading from the transcript the court
stated:
"THE COURT: That hasn't been our ground
rule up in the far country up here.'' ( Tr. 583)
As Nir. Young indicated the reading the testimony
of Mr. Duvall to the jury would of course impress the
members and help them to recall the testimony which
had been presented in the early days of the trial to weigh
it against the testimony introduced by Defendant during
the subsequent days of the trial. This certainly would
have been of considerable value to the jury in refreshing
the recollections of the individual jurors. The trial
judge, however, concluded that he did not have a right
I
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to allow counsel to read from the testimony and therefore ruled against Plaintiff, the following conversation
taking place :
''MR. NIELSEN : Well, of course, if your
Honor says I can't read it to them I won't.
''THE COURT: I may be in error. I hesitate
to let you start reading from excerpts.
''MR. NIELSEN: If your Honor says I can't
I won't, but I will take exception to the Court's
refusal to let me read it.
"THE COURT: That's understood." (Tr.
583)
The law is well settled that while the trial court has
discretion in a particular case to control the conduct of
counsel during the closing argument, nevertheless it is
equally well settled that counsel should be allowed to
read from the testimony of the witnesses if read from
the official transcript. The rule is stated in 53 Am. Jur.
TRIAL, Sec. 463, p. 368, as follows :
'' 'Vhile arguments of counsel are required to
be confined to the issues in the cases on trial, the
evidence and fair and reasonable deductions therefrom, and to arguments of opposing counsel, generally speaking, liberal freedom of speech should
be allo". ed. There are no hard-and-fast limitations
\Yithin "Thich the argument of earnest counsel
must be eonfined-no "Tell-defined bounds beyond
\Yhich the eloquence of an adYoeate shall not soar.
l-Ie ma~T di~cuss the facts proved or admitted in
thP pleadings, arraign the conduct of the parties,
and nttack the credibility of \Yitnesses. He may
indulge in oratorical co~ceit or flourish and in
illustrations and metaphorical allusions. He ·ma,y
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repeat the evidence verbatim for _the _purpo_se ~~
commenting on it in the connecttton ttn whtch ~t
~vas introduced at the trial, or he may refresh h~s
recollection of the testimony by reading from the
notes of the official reporter." (Italics added)
In the case of State v. Burns, 148 Mo. 167, 49 S.W.
1005, the court stated:
"Counsel for the State did not transcend the
evidence in alluding to the impeaching testimony
of the witness Clara Hunter. He repeated her
evidence verbatim in commenting upon the evidence of Defenda-nt's mother. It was legitimate
for that purpose, and was employed in that way
only." (Italics added)
In Gephart v. Stout, 11 Wn. (2d) 184, 118 P. (2d)
801, the action of the trial court in permitting Plaintiff's
counsel to read to the jury a portion of the testimony of
certain witnesses from a transcript of the evidence, over
Defendant's objection that the whole of the evidence of
the witness should be read, was held not to be an abuse
of discretion.
See also: Aasen v. Aasen, 228 Minn. 1, 36 N.W. 2d
27; Bonderson v. Hovde, 150 Minn. 175, 184 N.W. 853;
Killam v. Travelers Protective Ass 'n. of America, (Missouri 1939) 127 S.W. 2d 772; State v. Perkins, 143 Ia.
55, 120 N.W. 62.
In the recent case of Westling v. Holm., (Minnesota),
58 N.W. 2d 252, counsel began to read from a transcript
of the testimony, stating, ''And here is the precise
testimony on that point,'' whereupon the court ruled
39
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that he could not read from the paper "as a transcript"
but allowed counsel to read the material as being his
''absolute, honest, true and correct recollection of the
evidence.'' On appeal error was assigned is not permitting counsel to read from the "transcript" as the
official transcript of the evidence. In passing on the
point the court held:
''Whether the trial court abused this discretion
by directing counsel not to refer to the document
as a 'transcript' would not seem to be material
here. Counsel read portions of the testimony
which he deemed material, and in view of the
repeated references to the document as a transcript as outlined above, there can be little doubt
that the jury was a\Yare that it was from the court
reporter's transcript of the testimony. It follows
that no prejudice resulted from the ruling.''
In the instant matter counsel was not allowed to
read from the document as the transcript of testimony
or otherwise and therefore the error of the trial court
,,~as prejudicial. The Yery effect of the court's ruling on
the jury "~as such as to preclude them from requesting
that their recollection be refreshed as to the testimony
given during the first days of the trial.
\T

TliE COlTRT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
DIRECul, 1\ \..-ER.DIC~T IN F_A_ \TOR OF THE PLAINr~riFF~ lTPON .AJJ..J ()R. P.A.RT OF PL.AINTIFFS'
C01iP1.~l\ I NT.
A8 one of tht)ir R.equested Instructions Appellants
rt\questPd the eourt to direct a Yerdict in fayor of Plain40
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tiffs and against the Defendant on the complaint. (R. 33)
In addition, Plaintiff made a motion for a directed verdict
in respect to the loan made by Plaintiffs to the Duvall
~lining Company on December 4, 1950, as follows :
"MR. NIELSEN: I have a motion that I
,vould like to make. We move that the court direct
the jury as a matter of law to return a verdict
upon the transaction referred to in Exhibit ''X''
as transaction ... three ... upon the ground and
for the reason that the evidence as a matter of
law shows that at that time the defendant was
'"rithin and in possession of knowledge \\~hich he
failed to impart to the plaintiff in any \Yay changing or correcting the evidence \Yhich he himself
gave that he had previously represented to the
plaintiff, that according to the reports of the
engineers and otherwise, that the ore to be produced from said mine \vould be of a value of
approximately seven dollars per ton, when on
December 4, 1950, he in truth and in fact knew
that the value of such ore did not exceed approximately five dollars per ton; and upon the further
fact that the evidence is undisputed that he knew
at that time that the cost of producing the gold
from the ore \Yas in excess of nine dollars per ton
and that he had failed to retract or change his
previous representation that it would not cost in
excess of three dollars and fifty cents per ton to
produce the gold from such ore.'' ( Tr. 590, 591)

Appellants' position and contention with respect to
this point is somewhat related to the argument made that
the Court was under the duty to instruct the jury with
respect to the continuing nature of any representations
in the absence of any retraction on the part of Defendant
or knowledge of a change of conditions on the part of
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Plaintiffs. While it is not Appellants' intention to argue
at this time that the trial court should have directed a
verdict for Plaintiffs on the entire complaint, it is respectfully urged that the trial court should have directed
a verdict as to the specific loan made on December 4
1950. In making this contention Appellants rely pri-'
marily upon the testimony of the Defendant Duvall,
although the testimony of Plaintiffs' witnesses certainly
support and sustain such position.
During the presentation of Plaintiffs' evidence, the
Defendant Duvall was called to be examined under the
provisions of Rule 43(b), U.R.C.P. Previously Dr.
Douglas had testified that when Mr. Duvall had called
the Douglases into Duvall's office in the Ogden First
Federal Savings and Loan Association, Duvall had told
the Plaintiffs in substance and effect that "they had
already blocked out and diamond drilled 300,000 tons
of ore ranging in price from about three and a half or
four dollars a ton up to fifteen or sixteen, and he showed
me a blue print "Tith those figures on and intermittently
there were figures like nine something and eleven something, and he said, 'It eYen has gold that assays as high
as $50 a ton;' '' ( Tr. ~8) that the ore aTe raged seven or
eight dollars per ton: (Tr. 30) and that "the entire cost
of produeing this ore "Tould be in the neighborhood of
t"·o nn< I a half to three and a half dollars a ton, the
entire cost.'' (Tr. 31)
I)lnintiff further testified that in the early part of
DeePinher ln50 1\Ir. DuYnll asked Plaintiff to come to
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Duvall's office in the Ogden First Federal where Duvall
stated they "were going to expand the operation and
they were going to need new equipment and they were
going to have to raise some money"; (Tr. 36) that
Duvall would loan Plaintiffs $15,000 on their home; ( Tr.
37) that Plaintiff borrowed the money and loaned it to
the Duvall Company because of the previous, as well as
the immediate, representations made to them. (Tr. 88)
Plaintiff further testified that subsequent to the
first conversation which took place in March 1950, Mr.
Duvall never changed or contradicted the original representation as to the amount of ore blocked out, or the
cost of producing the gold from the ore, or the value of
the ore being produced; (Tr. 53) that at all times when
making the loans to the Duvall Mining Company Plaintiff relied on Mr. Duvall's judgment as a banker, and
had in mind the original representations which Mr.
Duvall had made concerning the quantity of ore and the
cost of producing it; that this information, together with
the other representations subsequently made, induced the
various loans. ( Tr. 88, 89)
Defendant's version of the original conversation
which took place in his office in March 1950 was somewhat different in that Defendant testified that he showed
the engineer's report (Defendant's Exh. 2) to Dr. Douglas and went over it in some detail; that Defendant relied
on the report and that the blue print testified to by Dr.
Douglas was prepared by Mr. Romney and contained
result of ore sampling. ( Tr. 411, 412, 422). With respect
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to the loan made in December 1950, Mr. Duvall testified
that "at that particular time it was concluded that
changes would be necessary in the plant and that we
would have to make some changes and improvements
and that the money would undoubtedly be needed, and
perhaps the money may have been needed in connection
with work that had already been done. I do not remember
the details completely of that conversation." (Tr. 430)
He further testified, after counsel for Defendant asked
him if he recalled discussing with Dr. Douglas anything
in connection with the loan that "if I remember correctly, Dr. Douglas stated that in order to make the
company a loan he would have to borrow money upon
his home, and a discussion took place in connection with
that; and I did agree, if I remember the dates and the
time correctly, that I did make him a loan with which
to loan this money to the company ; a loan upon his
home." (Tr. 431)
Following this answer, he was again asked by his
counsel:

'' Q. Do you recall in particular any specific
statements that 'vere made by you to him at or
a bout this time and in connection with this loan?''
To Y{hich he replied:
''A. I do not recall in detail the statements
thn t ,,,.ere made to him."
We nre therefore left to the unescapable conclusion
that Defendant did not bring to the attention of Dr.
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Douglas Defendant's knowledge of what had taken place
at the mine during the summer of 1950, and particularly
Defendant did not change or correct the representations
made in 1\'Iarch 1950-whether such representations were
as contained in the engineer's report or as testified to
by Dr. Douglas.
As to his familiarity with conditions during the
summer and fall of 1950, Defendant testified that he was
familiar with activities from month to month; (Tr. 101)
that Mr. Romney was keeping a day to day record which
was available to Defendant and which he saw frequently;
(Tr. 103) that he knew that the Company was not receiving more than about $2.00 per ton out of the ore
being produced; that "it was not a good recovery"; and
that he knew when he approached Dr. Douglas for a
loan in December 1950 that the company had sustained
an operating loss (before depreciation and depletion) or
something like $21,537.44. (Tr. 104) He further admitted
that he was familiar with the information contained on
Exhibits H, I, and J during the course of the summer
and fall of 1950; that daily records were kept by Mr.
Romney at the mine which he saw at least once a week
(Tr. 115). He further testified on cross-examination that
when the loan was made on December 4, 1950 he '' certainly knew that the recovery on the ores and the receipts
from the smelter were not equalling the expenses that
we were paying out for equipment and operations,'' ( Tr.
142) and that "I knew that we were not receiving sufficient funds to pay the operating costs." ( Tr. 505)
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Plaintiffs' Exhibit M further illustrates what the
operations were in the year 1950, as well as in subsequent
years was corroborated by Mr. Romney {Tr. 370).
After having testified in substance as outlined above,
the Defendant further testified, upon being pressed by
counsel on cross-examination, as follows:
'' Q. Now, Mr. Duvall, you previously testified
that as early as the first shipment in September
and October of 1950, you realized then how much
you were getting out of the ore you were producing, did you not~
'' .L\_.

September and October of 1950 ~

''Q. Yes.
' 'A. Well, in September of 1950 were the first
few shipments, and October. And we realized
that those shipments were not, certainly not ninety
per cent or anywhere near that.

''Q. And you kne"T at that time that the assays
of the ore that was going into the tanks was less
than $5.00 per ton, didn't you~
''A. I don't remember the exact amount of
that, but there were variations in the body of ore
as to values, so that might not have concerned us
too much if we were starting on a point that was
in what we term lower or higher grade areas.
'' Q. But you did kno"'.,. that the checks that
you were writing out were considerably more than
what you 'Yere bringing in in terms of Yalues of
the gold, V{eren 't they~
"..:\. Very definitely.

'' Q. And so by the time the mine shut down
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her, you were confronted with the situation of
having to raise about $15,000 to $25,000 to pay
the bills that were outstanding for that year's
operation, weren't you~
"A. That is probably true.

"Q. And it's a fact, is it not, Mr. Duvall, that
you didn't tell Mr. Douglas, when he came in and
you asked him to mortgage his home to you on or
about December 4, that the reason you wanted
this money was to pay these bills because the
operation was a losing proposition in 1950~ Just
answer that if you did or did not tell him.
"A. I can't answer that, whether I did or did
not, without an explanation.''
The foregoing testimony clearly puts this situation
within the specific language of Section 551, subsection
(2) (b) and the accompanying illustration, contained in
the Restatement on the Law of Torts. We therefore
submit that the court should have so directed the jury
to return a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs at least on the
loan made by them on December 4, 1950. As previously
stated the court should have made further directions to
the jury which would have limited the issues to be resolved by the jury on the other loans made.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the
trial court should have directed a verdict in Plaintiffs'
favor as to the loan made in December 1950 and should
have submitted the remainder of the case to the jury on
instructions which would have limited the issues to be
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decided. In so doing the court should not have submitted
the case to the jury on detailed written interrogatories,
allowing them to speculate on issues concerning which
there was no dispute in the evidence. Too, the court
failed properly to instruct the jury on finding the representations to have been made substantially as alleged
and improperly commented on the evidence during the
giving of the instructions. The court likewise failed to
instruct the jury with respect to the duty of the Defendant to correct or change any statement or representation subsequently determined to be incorrect. And
finally, the Court improperly refused permission to
counsel for the Plaintiffs to read from a transcript of
the testimony in final argument and summation to the
Jury.
Respectfully submitted,
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN
NIELSEN & CONDER
CLYDE C. WALLER
Attorneys for Appellants
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